Archive for the ‘Bank Failure’ Category
Posted by Larry Doyle on November 10th, 2009 4:28 PM |
Having broached expectant difficulties in the Federal Home Loan Bank system last spring, I try to keep a close eye out for news of note on this largely unknown – but critically important – system of banks. To a large extent, the FHLBs have been flying under the radar despite some serious problems within their investment portfolios and loan books.
High five to KD for pointing out that the folks at FHLB-Seattle probably are not getting much sleep these days. Why is that? Insufficient capital will do it to you every time. As the American Banker offers, FHLB Seattle Still “Undercapitalized,” Regulator Says:
The Federal Housing Finance Agency said late Friday that the Federal Home Loan Bank of Seattle remains “undercapitalized” and will not be allowed to redeem or repurchase stock or pay dividends.
At the end of 2004, as the bank struggled with the size of its mortgage purchase program, it said members who wish to redeem their stock must wait five years before receiving their money.
But with that time period almost up, the Finance Agency said it would not allow the bank to begin redeeming stock, fearing it could lower its capital base. (more…)
Tags: Federal Home Loan Banks, Federal Housing Finance Agency, FHFA, FHFA Acting Director Edward DeMarco, FHLB Seattle, FHLB Seattle mortgage purchase program, FHLB-Seattle Still Undercapitalized, FHLBs, insufficeint capital at FHLB-Seattle, loan demand at FHLB-Seattle, portfolio of FHLB-Seattle
Posted in Bank Failure, Banking Institutions, Federal Home Loan Banks, General, Mortgages, bank earnings | No Comments »
Posted by Larry Doyle on October 29th, 2009 9:52 AM |

FDIC Head Sheila Bair
“Too big to fail.”
Do you think the American public is sufficiently sickened by that phrase? No doubt.
How will our ‘wizards in Washington’ handle this monstrous issue going forward? Is there any doubt that the industry itself should be held accountable to provide the necessary capital to unwind firms deemed ‘too big to fail?’ Of course not. However, the execution of that policy is where the rubber meets the road and where we learn who in Washington is truly working for the American public and who is working for the financial industry. How so? Let’s navigate. (more…)
Tags: Bair Breaks With Obama Urges Preepaying Costs to Unwind Firms, FCRF, FDIC, Financial Company Resolution Fund, Sheila Bair, systemic regulator, systemic risk, Tim Geithner, too big to fail, unwinding firms too big to fail
Posted in Bank Failure, Banking Institutions, General, Sheila Bair, Tim Geithner, regulation | 4 Comments »
Posted by Larry Doyle on October 1st, 2009 11:38 AM |
Financial chicanery and accounting charades come in all shapes and sizes. From mismarking trading positions on Wall Street to running massive Ponzi schemes and with many other stops along the way, the games people play to accrue false profits and cover real losses are endless. That said, all this artifice ultimately does end as the true value, or lack thereof, of the underlying assets is flushed out. For this very reason, I remain extremely concerned about the economy and overly conservative in my approach to the markets.
While we could debate at length about the necessity and efficacy of the FASB’s relaxation of the mark-to-market accounting for bank assets, ultimately the accounting will not truly matter. Why? The value of the assets on the banks’ balance sheets will find their true level. In the process, the banks will be sufficiently capitalized, or not. My bet is that many more of these banks will not be sufficiently well capitalized. Additionally, do not expect bank examiners and regulators to share this information.
I see clear evidence of this exact scenario in reading Bloomberg’s esteemed columnist Jonathan Weil’s commentary, Banks Have Us Flying Blind on Depth of Losses:
There was a stunning omission from the government’s latest list of “problem” banks, which ran to 416 lenders, a 15-year high, as of June 30. One outfit not on the list was Georgian Bank, the second-largest Atlanta-based bank, which supposedly had plenty of capital.
It failed last week.
Georgian’s clean-up will be unusually costly. The book value of Georgian’s assets was $2 billion as of July 24, about the same as the bank’s deposit liabilities, according to a Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. press release. The FDIC estimates the collapse will cost its insurance fund $892 million, or 45 percent of the bank’s assets. That percentage was almost double the average for this year’s 95 U.S. bank failures, and it was the highest among the 10 largest ones.
Do you think Georgian Bank was a special situation that somehow slipped past the accountants, examiners, and regulators? If you believe that, I have some AAA sub-prime CDOs for you that really look like good value.
What do we learn with the failure of Georgian? As Weil attests:
The cost of Georgian’s failure confirms that the bank’s asset values were too optimistic. It also helps explain why the FDIC, led by Chairman Sheila Bair, is resorting to extraordinary measures to replenish its battered insurance fund.
How many other ‘Georgians’ are out there? Plenty. The material difference amidst the banking system is the composition of the loan and investment portfolios of different institutions. Despite the fact that the FASB, pressured by Congress and Wall Street, has allowed banks to utilize chicanery and charades to cloud our view, fortunately we have journalists like Jonathan Weil to provide some clarity.
Might we be able to get Mr. Weil to shed some light on “Analyst Exposes Wells Fargo Balance Sheet Charade”?
LD
Tags: accounting frauds, bank accounting, Bank capital, bank regulators and bank examiners, concerns about the economy, failure of Gergian bank in Atlanta, false profits, FASB's relaxation of the mark to market, FDIC, FDIC insurance fund, financial artifice, financial chicanery, Jonathan Weil writes Banks Have Us Flying Blind on Depth of Losses, mismarking trading positions, Ponzi schemes, real losses, value of bank assets, Wells Fargo Balance Sheet, will banks be sufficently well capitalized
Posted in Bank Failure, FASB, FDIC, Forensic Accounting, General, Mark-to-Market, Mortgage Crisis, Wall Street, accounting, bank earnings, financial frauds, markets | 2 Comments »
Posted by Larry Doyle on April 20th, 2009 2:30 PM |
The broad equity market indices are down 3+% on the day. Why would that happen when the bulk of company news today was generally positive? At least on the surface the news was positive:
1. Bank of America posted .44 earnings per share vs. expectations of .04
2. Eli Lilly earnings were up 23% outpacing expectations.
3. Halliburton disappointed with earnings down 35% but that is due to the massive correction in the price of oil from a year ago.
Merger Activity:
4. Oracle is purchasing Sun Microsystems in a $7.4 billion deal.
5. Pepsi is buying two bottling companies for $6 billion.
6. Glaxo is purchasing Stiefel for $2.9 billion.
Leading economic indicators declined by .3 but that decline is offset by an improved reading from the prior month.
Then, why is the market down so much? Two reasons are promoted, but only one of them is getting proper coverage.
Market analysts supposedly are focused today on the ongoing increases in chargeoffs and writedowns on the loan portfolios in the banking industry. These loans consist of credit card loans, residential mortgages, commercial mortgages, and corporate loans.
I don’t buy this line of reasoning for today’s selloff. Increased chargeoffs and writedowns have been widely expected for a while. The level of reserves taken by the banks has been widely panned as being insufficient. Then why is the market down so much? (more…)
Tags: chargeoffs on loans, credit chargeoffs, credit quality problems, debt for equity swap, dilution of bank stocks, equity market selloff, equity market selloff on April 20, loan writedowns
Posted in Bank Failure, Bank Stress Test, Bank of America, Wall Street | 7 Comments »
Posted by Larry Doyle on April 9th, 2009 3:56 PM |
Any investor or manager with a degree of experience knows that the “first loss is the best loss.” What do I mean by that? Once the market detects a loss or a weakened position, the price for that asset will remain capped unless and until the asset is sold or liquidated. This price action occurs in every sector of every market.
Welcome to the world of global finance 2009. As banks, insurance companies, hedge funds, and other financial entities deal with losses, we see a lack of aggressive posture being taken on dealing with these losses. Why? Once moral hazard is violated with a single entity, every other entity will look to violate it as well.
Immediate losses are forestalled in hopes that they will be covered or disguised. However, every loss ultimately must be recognized. By whom and how is the question.
At this juncture, more of the losses in our financial system are being directed toward the taxpayers. How? Via the wide array of government programs. What is the cost? A likely underperforming economy due to a lack of credit, and higher taxes to offset lower revenues. (more…)
Tags: Bank Stress Tests, Economy, jonathan Weil, losses in banking system, Moral Hazard, Obama Administration
Posted in Bailout, Bank Failure, Bank Stress Test, Banking Institutions, Congress, Current Affairs, Economic Stimulus, Economy, Employment, General, Mark-to-Market, Obama Administration, Risk, Wall Street | 5 Comments »
Posted by Larry Doyle on April 8th, 2009 11:35 AM |
Why is it urban school dropout rates are 50%? Well, I am sure there would be as many reasons for that horrendous statistic as there are dropouts. The fact of the matter is, though, the state of urban education has promoted a phenomena known as “social promotion.” If students aren’t qualified to do the work, testing has been gamed, standards have been lowered, and corners have been cut. As a result, urban education at this stage is an unmitigated disaster. What does this have to do with the current state of our economy and the world of finance? I am glad you asked.
If banks, much like students, are not required to pass rigorous testing, then “social promotion” in finance will produce results not unlike those in education–underperformance and ultimately an inability to compete on the global stage.
Against that backdrop, I personally looked forward to the results of the Bank Stress Tests. Let’s finally get an honest assessment of the “students.” Let’s see how they have performed and let’s project to see how they will perform!!
As with any test, the results are only meaningful if the process and proctor have unquestioned integrity. The proctors for the Bank Stress Test are none other than Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner and Fed chair Ben Bernanke. Why is a testing authority of the magnitude of FDIC, led by Sheila Bair, not more involved in the process? Ms. Bair is the one individual in our country with the greatest level of interaction with and understanding of the student body, that being the banking industry as a whole and individual banks specifically. (more…)
Tags: Bank Stress Tests, Basell II, Ben Bernanke, FDIC, Sheila Bair, social promotion, Tim Geithner, transparency of bank stress tests
Posted in Bad Bank, Bank Failure, Bank Stress Test, Bank of America, Banking Institutions, Business, Commerce, Economy, FDIC, General, Reputation, Sheila Bair, Tim Geithner, Wall Street | 6 Comments »
Posted by Larry Doyle on April 7th, 2009 5:45 AM |
I am no fan of George Soros. I often believe he does not draw a hard line between his political interests and his business interests. His active support with MoveOn.org has made a mockery of any attempt to achieve campaign finance reform.
That said, for those involved in global finance, whether you like George Soros or not, you need to know what he is thinking. Why? George Soros can move markets via his own investment strategies. Additionally, there is little doubt that George is the epicenter in a massive flow of market sensitive information.
To that end, Soros gave a stinging indictment of the change in the FASB’s mark-to-market by stating in a Bloomberg interview,
the change to fair-value accounting rules will keep troubled banks in business, stalling a recovery of the U.S. economy.
“This is part of the muddling through scenario where we are going to keep zombie banks alive,” Soros, 78, said today in an interview with Bloomberg Television. “It’s going to sap the energies of the economy.”
Is this statement a self-serving offering by Soros? Who knows? Is it an attempt to further promote the U.S. as a lessened power? Perhaps. That said, there are others, myself included, who believe the relaxation of the mark-to-market, especially for outfits like Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, and the 12 regional Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs) is nothing short of a charade.
Did Soros’ statement have an impact on the market? Not today. The dollar has been improving of late. However, over the longer haul, the cost of having a number of zombie-like banking institutions will be pressure on the dollar along with increased borrowing costs for the zombie institutions or Uncle Sam who will be backing them.
From a personal perspective, would you lend money to a zombie?
And now, here’s a must-watch little treat. Crank up your speakers . . .

LD
Tags: Fannie Mae, Federal Home Loan Banks, Freddie Mac, George Soros, relaxation of the mark to market, Zombie like banks
Posted in Bank Failure, FASB, Mark-to-Market | No Comments »
Posted by Larry Doyle on April 6th, 2009 4:30 PM |
A few loyal readers have graciously shared video clips of interviews with former banking regulator, William K. Black. These interviews address the fact that a tremendous amount of mortgage originations at the core of our current economic turmoil were fraudulently underwritten. The borrowers were never qualified only then to fall upon hard times. The loans were often NINJA (No income check, No job check or asset check) and the fraud was more often committed by the lender than the borrower.
Why and how did this happen? Let’s briefly revisit my writing from November 12th:
At the turn of the century, the Wall Street model was a pure “originate to distribute” model with little to no residual risk on behalf of the originators or underwriters. When there is no residual risk, those who “WIN” are the players that can purely process the most volume. Well, how does one get volume? Lower the credit standards, put fewer restrictions on borrowers, little to no covenants (NINA Loans … no income, no asset check). WOW!!! What were we thinking?? Well Wall St. felt, “let’s worry about it tomorrow or maybe not at all because we are making too much money today.”
That money SUPPOSEDLY being made left tremendous risks on the books of the banks. The pursuit of ever greater SUPPOSED profits incorporated the use of CDS (credit default swaps) as synthetic collateral for structured deals. These CDS allowed for an enormous increase in volume and SUPPOSED profits. Don’t forget, though, at the core of the process a large percentage of the underlying loans were fraudulently underwritten. (more…)
Tags: American banking industry, banking regulator, fraudulently originated loans, NINJNA loans, Ponzi scheme, the Wall street model, William Black
Posted in Bad Bank, Bailout, Bank Failure, Banking Institutions, Wall Street | 12 Comments »
Posted by Larry Doyle on April 6th, 2009 10:27 AM |
The key for the global markets and economy is the ability to refinance outstanding debt. In the absence of a viable asset securitization market, will banks provide financing for current loans to be refinanced as they come due? Please remember the asset securitization market represented approximately 40% of total lending, so we are talking about a MAJOR segment of the market.
As banks assess applications for loan refinancings, they will impose ever more stringent underwriting standards as they will most likely put these loans on their books. Consumers, small businesses, and major corporations that do not have solid balance sheets and income statements will NOT get new financing. What happens to the existing loans that can’t get refinanced? The process is as such:
1. loan becomes delinquent
2. loan defaults
3. lender forecloses and takes possession of asset
4. lender attempts to liquidate asset via sale, pressuring valuation of assets in that sector.
5. original lender books loss on non-performing asset
What does it all mean? Losses on asset classes across the board. Can government programs plug the holes in the refinancing markets? Well, the Federal Reserve is known as the lender of last resort but their loans extend primarily to the banks themselves to plug holes in their balance sheets. The other governmental programs (TALF, PPIP) will hopefully restart the asset securitization markets and bring liquidity back in for refinancing. Will these programs hold the waves behind the dike? To a certain extent, but my recommendation is . . . get to higher ground. (more…)
Tags: asset securitization market, loan underwriting standards, Mike Mayo, process of loan foreclosure, refinancing risk, risk of default on high yield loans
Posted in Bank Failure, Toxic Assets, Wall Street | 3 Comments »
Posted by Larry Doyle on April 4th, 2009 10:07 AM |
I much prefer a rallying stock market, but I am not a day trader trying to catch moves for quick flips. I look for changes in economic fundamentals (incorporating both private sector and public sector inputs), assess those changes with market technicals (overbought and oversold conditions), and position myself accordingly.
The big wild card in current analysis is the impact of public sector inputs. Many of the maneuvers utilized by the Treasury and Federal Reserve have never been used prior to this economic downturn. Are they working? To what extent? What are the unintended consequences? What is the time delay from implementing a program to measuring its impact on the economy? These questions are the topics of protracted discussions by economists, bankers, analysts, and money managers around the globe. I’d also like to address them here at Sense on Cents.
My market instincts tell me that programs injecting trillions of dollars across wide swaths of the market are not without costs. These costs in the form of ”crowding out“, distorted competition, changed behaviors (AIG undercutting insurance rates), moral hazards, and inflation are very real. The challenge is assessing the risks of these long term costs versus the necessity of providing sufficient capital and liquidity backstops to support the economy. (more…)
Tags: crowding out, economic fundamentals, Fibonacci Retracement, moral hazards, more government bailouts, rallying stock market, relaxation of mark to market, technical analysis
Posted in Bailout, Bank Failure, Banking Institutions, Credit Risk, Economic Stimulus, Economy, Equity Markets, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Government funds, Obama Administration, Tim Geithner, Wall Street | 14 Comments »