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Posts Tagged ‘Bank capital’

UPDATE: FASB 166 and 167

Posted by Larry Doyle on December 4th, 2009 11:27 AM |

Is Wall Street getting a reprieve from the capital constraints that would be effected by the implementation of FASB 166 and 167? I first broached this topic a month ago in writing, “12th Street Capital Reviews FASB 166 and 167 and Tells Us Why Wall Street Will Need More Capital”:

In brief, FASB 166 and 167 will require hundreds of billions in assets to be moved from off-balance sheet vehicles onto the balance sheets of the financial institutions. As those assets, which are embedded in an array of securitization transactions, come on balance sheet, the banks and non-banks alike will have to raise more capital to support the growth in their balance sheets. Best guesstimate is that the institutions will need to raise capital in the tens of billions.

12th Street Capital provides us updated developments on this very important topic with the following release: (more…)

Financial Chicanery and Accounting Charades

Posted by Larry Doyle on October 1st, 2009 11:38 AM |

Financial chicanery and accounting charades come in all shapes and sizes. From mismarking trading positions on Wall Street to running massive Ponzi schemes and with many other stops along the way, the games people play to accrue false profits and cover real losses are endless. That said, all this artifice ultimately does end as the true value, or lack thereof, of the underlying assets is flushed out. For this very reason, I remain extremely concerned about the economy and overly conservative in my approach to the markets.

While we could debate at length about the necessity and efficacy of the FASB’s relaxation of the mark-to-market accounting for bank assets, ultimately the accounting will not truly matter. Why? The value of the assets on the banks’ balance sheets will find their true level. In the process, the banks will be sufficiently capitalized, or not. My bet is that many more of these banks will not be sufficiently well capitalized. Additionally, do not expect bank examiners and regulators to share this information.

I see clear evidence of this exact scenario in reading Bloomberg’s esteemed columnist Jonathan Weil’s commentary, Banks Have Us Flying Blind on Depth of Losses:

There was a stunning omission from the government’s latest list of “problem” banks, which ran to 416 lenders, a 15-year high, as of June 30. One outfit not on the list was Georgian Bank, the second-largest Atlanta-based bank, which supposedly had plenty of capital.

It failed last week.

Georgian’s clean-up will be unusually costly. The book value of Georgian’s assets was $2 billion as of July 24, about the same as the bank’s deposit liabilities, according to a Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. press release. The FDIC estimates the collapse will cost its insurance fund $892 million, or 45 percent of the bank’s assets. That percentage was almost double the average for this year’s 95 U.S. bank failures, and it was the highest among the 10 largest ones.

Do you think Georgian Bank was a special situation that somehow slipped past the accountants, examiners, and regulators? If you believe that, I have some AAA sub-prime CDOs for you that really look like good value.

What do we learn with the failure of Georgian? As Weil attests:

The cost of Georgian’s failure confirms that the bank’s asset values were too optimistic. It also helps explain why the FDIC, led by Chairman Sheila Bair, is resorting to extraordinary measures to replenish its battered insurance fund.

How many other ‘Georgians’ are out there? Plenty. The material difference amidst the banking system is the composition of the loan and investment portfolios of different institutions. Despite the fact that the FASB, pressured by Congress and Wall Street, has allowed banks to utilize chicanery and charades to cloud our view, fortunately we have journalists like Jonathan Weil to provide some clarity.

Might we be able to get Mr. Weil to shed some light on “Analyst Exposes Wells Fargo Balance Sheet Charade”?

LD

Bank Stress Tests? Take Home Exams and Partially Self-Graded

Posted by Larry Doyle on April 24th, 2009 3:10 PM |

The Treasury just released the methodology used in assessing the vitality of the 19 largest banks via the Bank Stress Tests. The market took the release of this methodology as a big yawn. Treasury offered that the capital at some banks has been “substantially reduced.”  Please tell us something we don’t know.

The worst case scenario used by Treasury still falls into the camp of what most analysts view as the expected scenario.

In reading deeper into some of the reviews of the methodology, I am struck by the leeway provided to the banks in measuring the credit quality of loans on the banks’ books and the likelihood of deterioration on those loans. I view that as the wiggle room described by Meredith Whitney earlier this week.

As Bloomberg reports, Fed Says Capital at Some Major Banks Is Substantially Reduced:

“Firms were allowed to diverge from the indicative loss rates where they could provide evidence that their estimated loss rates were appropriate,” the study said.

Regulators used the market shocks of the second half of 2008, when Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. declared bankruptcy, as the model for testing banks with trading portfolios of $100 billion or more.

As they pored over banks’ loan and securities portfolios and off-balance-sheet liabilities, examiners increasingly focused on the quality of credits. They were concerned about wide variations in underwriting standards, a regulatory official said this week.

Supervisors concluded that banks’ lending practices need to be given as much weight as macroeconomic scenarios in determining the health of each bank, the official said.

The goal of the reviews is to keep the major financial institutions lending over the next two years, and to determine how much capital they may need if the economic slump worsens.

Supervisors will weigh how much capital each company holds, its ability to retain earnings over the next few years, future access to private capital and the extent any asset writedowns.

The Bank Stress Tests are not only largely a take home exam, but now we discover they are partially self-graded.

Call me suspicious.

In speaking with friends on Wall Street, I have heard from a number of individuals that there is still a large short base in a number of the financials. The short base is providing a strong cushion to that sector specifically and the market in general.

LD






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