Subscribe: RSS Feed | Twitter | Facebook | Email
Home | Contact Us

Archive for the ‘bank earnings’ Category

Will ‘Too Big to Fail’ Banks Charge for Deposits?

Posted by Larry Doyle on November 25th, 2013 9:38 AM |

$82 billion.

What does that figure represent? The subsidy (aka competitive advantage) that accrues to our major banking institutions from favorable borrowing rates given their status as ‘too big to fail.’

Those tens of billions of dollars truly represent a nice, big head start for a handful of banks, and a withering assault on the precepts of free market capitalism for the rest of us.

As if $82 billion were not enough of a subsidy, let’s not forget that these banks pay you, as a depositor, virtually zero interest for the ‘privilege’ of holding your money there. Well, that may be changing. How so? How would you like to actually pay interest to the banks in order to keep your money in their institutions? Really? No way?

Yes way.  (more…)

5 Years Later: Banks Still Too Leveraged

Posted by Larry Doyle on September 12th, 2013 9:09 AM |

Do you think there is a reason why bank balance sheets are so convoluted and opaque? Of course there is.

The lack of meaningful transparency allows the banks to continue to employ excessive degrees of leverage across a widely disparate array of businesses and with a paucity of competition all in the hope of generating outsized returns. But who do you think bears the ultimate risk?

They pursue these paths with the support of the Federal Reserve’s zero interest rate policy and a regulatory system that belies meaningful oversight despite those who might want us to believe that Dodd-Frank brought reform to the system.

Former FDIC chair Sheila Bair does not leave much to interpretation on these topics.  (more…)

BofA Shareholders, ‘How Long Can You Tread Water?’

Posted by Larry Doyle on June 13th, 2011 9:03 AM |

What did the Lord say to Noah?

The same thing that Bank of America CEO Brian Moynihan might now be saying to his shareholders. That is, ‘how long can you tread water?’

Bank of America’s stock is down approximately 25% on the year and close to 35% over the last twelve months. While it has doubled from the Armageddon lows seen in 2008, the stock has fully retraced any moves higher since early 2009.   (The graph of Bank of America below is sourced from Market Watch and covers the last three years).

What gives? Will Bank of America need to raise more capital? Will it need another lifeline from Uncle Sam?

(more…)

Sleepless in Seattle . . . FHLB-Seattle, That Is

Posted by Larry Doyle on November 10th, 2009 4:28 PM |

Having broached expectant difficulties in the Federal Home Loan Bank system last spring, I try to keep a close eye out for news of note on this largely unknown – but critically important – system of banks. To a large extent, the FHLBs have been flying under the radar despite some serious problems within their investment portfolios and loan books.

High five to KD for pointing out that the folks at FHLB-Seattle probably are not getting much sleep these days. Why is that? Insufficient capital will do it to you every time. As the American Banker offers, FHLB Seattle Still “Undercapitalized,” Regulator Says:

The Federal Housing Finance Agency said late Friday that the Federal Home Loan Bank of Seattle remains “undercapitalized” and will not be allowed to redeem or repurchase stock or pay dividends.

At the end of 2004, as the bank struggled with the size of its mortgage purchase program, it said members who wish to redeem their stock must wait five years before receiving their money.

But with that time period almost up, the Finance Agency said it would not allow the bank to begin redeeming stock, fearing it could lower its capital base. (more…)

Financial Chicanery and Accounting Charades

Posted by Larry Doyle on October 1st, 2009 11:38 AM |

Financial chicanery and accounting charades come in all shapes and sizes. From mismarking trading positions on Wall Street to running massive Ponzi schemes and with many other stops along the way, the games people play to accrue false profits and cover real losses are endless. That said, all this artifice ultimately does end as the true value, or lack thereof, of the underlying assets is flushed out. For this very reason, I remain extremely concerned about the economy and overly conservative in my approach to the markets.

While we could debate at length about the necessity and efficacy of the FASB’s relaxation of the mark-to-market accounting for bank assets, ultimately the accounting will not truly matter. Why? The value of the assets on the banks’ balance sheets will find their true level. In the process, the banks will be sufficiently capitalized, or not. My bet is that many more of these banks will not be sufficiently well capitalized. Additionally, do not expect bank examiners and regulators to share this information.

I see clear evidence of this exact scenario in reading Bloomberg’s esteemed columnist Jonathan Weil’s commentary, Banks Have Us Flying Blind on Depth of Losses:

There was a stunning omission from the government’s latest list of “problem” banks, which ran to 416 lenders, a 15-year high, as of June 30. One outfit not on the list was Georgian Bank, the second-largest Atlanta-based bank, which supposedly had plenty of capital.

It failed last week.

Georgian’s clean-up will be unusually costly. The book value of Georgian’s assets was $2 billion as of July 24, about the same as the bank’s deposit liabilities, according to a Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. press release. The FDIC estimates the collapse will cost its insurance fund $892 million, or 45 percent of the bank’s assets. That percentage was almost double the average for this year’s 95 U.S. bank failures, and it was the highest among the 10 largest ones.

Do you think Georgian Bank was a special situation that somehow slipped past the accountants, examiners, and regulators? If you believe that, I have some AAA sub-prime CDOs for you that really look like good value.

What do we learn with the failure of Georgian? As Weil attests:

The cost of Georgian’s failure confirms that the bank’s asset values were too optimistic. It also helps explain why the FDIC, led by Chairman Sheila Bair, is resorting to extraordinary measures to replenish its battered insurance fund.

How many other ‘Georgians’ are out there? Plenty. The material difference amidst the banking system is the composition of the loan and investment portfolios of different institutions. Despite the fact that the FASB, pressured by Congress and Wall Street, has allowed banks to utilize chicanery and charades to cloud our view, fortunately we have journalists like Jonathan Weil to provide some clarity.

Might we be able to get Mr. Weil to shed some light on “Analyst Exposes Wells Fargo Balance Sheet Charade”?

LD

How Will Banks ‘Manage’ Earnings?

Posted by Larry Doyle on July 14th, 2009 8:09 AM |

A number of major financial institutions are reporting 2nd quarter earnings this week. Actually, to say these institutions are truly reporting earnings would be a misnomer. To a large extent, these institutions are releasing managed earnings reports. What does that mean? Let’s navigate this ever important sector of our economic landscape.

In simplistic fashion, earnings are revenues less expenses. While financial analysts may want us to take reported earnings on face value, there is a lot more to it than that. What are the quality of the earnings? Are revenues increasing or decreasing? Are expenses increasing or decreasing? Are net margins of profitability increasing or decreasing? Are earnings a function of a growth in revenues or more a reduction in expenses?

In regard to a financial institution’s earnings, the greatest expense is typically compensation and benefits. On Wall Street, the expense associated with personnel usually runs between 50-55% of overall expenses.

On the revenue side of the ledger, earnings are broken down by division. How much revenue is produced from fee-generating business units and is repeatable versus how much is generated from volatile trading businesses and is thus more risky. Fee generating revenue is considered to be of higher quality. As such, the market attaches a higher multiple to the earnings from those business units.

In my opinion, the most opaque component of earnings and income statements revolves around valuations of assets held on the financial institution’s books. This component of an earnings statement is truly where the financial wizards on Wall Street get most creative.  The assets to which I refer are:

1. Securities positions, that is, the variety of different bonds, stocks, and derivatives held by the institutions. While plenty of these assets are very liquid, easily evaluated, and thus easily marked, others are much less so. For a wealth of toxic assets (different types of mortgage assets, CDOs, and the like), these institutions were blessed by the FASB (Federal Accounting Standards Board) to mark them at levels which they deem appropriate versus where the assets may actually be trading in the marketplace. In the process, these institutions are sitting on hundreds of billions of embedded, yet unrealized, losses. How and when may those losses be recognized? When the underlying loans backing these securities default. Let’s move to that aspect of ‘managed earnings.’ (more…)






Recent Posts


ECONOMIC ALL-STARS


Archives