Subscribe: RSS Feed | Twitter | Facebook | Email
Home | Contact Us

Posts Tagged ‘FHLBs’

Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae Deja Vu?: Part II

Posted by Larry Doyle on April 8th, 2010 11:51 AM |

On Christmas Eve 2009, the Obama administration provided a blank check to the wards of the state known as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. (“Fannie and Freddie’s Huge Christmas Bonus”)

What other quasi-government institutions have a very similar business profile as Freddie and Fannie? The Federal Home Loan Bank system, acronym FHLBs, commonly referred to within the financial industry as FLUBs. I will reserve comment on that moniker. Ten months ago, I questioned whether the dynamics at work within the FHLB system would be the equivalent of what has transpired at Freddie and Fannie. I wrote “Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae Deja Vu?” and highlighted:

Can our economy absorb another financial hit of the magnitude of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae? (more…)

FHLB-Seattle Sues Wall Street

Posted by Larry Doyle on January 27th, 2010 9:54 AM |

When people lose a lot of money, it’s no surprise that they find a lot of lawyers and a lot of reasons to start bringing lawsuits.

Talking about losses, I first introduced readers to the expected red ink within the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system last May. I wrote “FHLBs: Red Sea, Dead Sea or Both?” and “Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae Deja Vu?” to highlight the embedded losses within the FHLB system. The losses are centered in the massive mortgage portfolios within the system. The toxic waste within a lot of these mortgages is now being realized in terms of actual losses as an ever increasing percentage of the mortgages default. What’s the result? Let’s go to court.

Thank you to a loyal Sense on Cents supporter for highlighting a developing lawsuit. The FHLB-Seattle is effectively suing all of Wall Street. This suit and its underlying roots deserve significant broad based coverage. Why? (more…)

Sleepless in Seattle . . . FHLB-Seattle, That Is

Posted by Larry Doyle on November 10th, 2009 4:28 PM |

Having broached expectant difficulties in the Federal Home Loan Bank system last spring, I try to keep a close eye out for news of note on this largely unknown – but critically important – system of banks. To a large extent, the FHLBs have been flying under the radar despite some serious problems within their investment portfolios and loan books.

High five to KD for pointing out that the folks at FHLB-Seattle probably are not getting much sleep these days. Why is that? Insufficient capital will do it to you every time. As the American Banker offers, FHLB Seattle Still “Undercapitalized,” Regulator Says:

The Federal Housing Finance Agency said late Friday that the Federal Home Loan Bank of Seattle remains “undercapitalized” and will not be allowed to redeem or repurchase stock or pay dividends.

At the end of 2004, as the bank struggled with the size of its mortgage purchase program, it said members who wish to redeem their stock must wait five years before receiving their money.

But with that time period almost up, the Finance Agency said it would not allow the bank to begin redeeming stock, fearing it could lower its capital base. (more…)

Financial Cooking

Posted by Larry Doyle on July 5th, 2009 8:46 AM |

When business operations make money, it is due to the brains and intellect of management, correct? When business operations lose money, it is some sort of nefarious measure at work in the marketplace which can be ‘corrected’ by changing the rules, correct? The implementation of the relaxation of the FASB’s (Federal Accounting Standard Board’s) mark-to-market utilizes that thought process. Make no mistake, it is flawed and simply allows financial institutions to ‘manage earnings,’ otherwise known as “cook the books.”

We receive a whiff of this recipe in a report by the Wall Street Journal, Home Loan Banks See Net Income Decline 51%. I have maintained that the basic business model of the FHLBs is flawed and we see evidence of this in the fact that outstanding advances (loans) by the FHLBs to their member banks actually decreased in the 1st quarter of this year:

Total advances outstanding from the banks declined to $817.41 billion as of March 31 from $928.64 billion three months earlier. After surging in 2007 and early 2008, demand for those advances has slackened, partly because of the recession and partly because the federal government has offered alternative funding programs for commercial banks.

Without even maintaining the level of advances, the FHLB system is coming under increasing pressure to generate earnings in the face of increasing delinquencies, defaults, and foreclosures on all of their holdings–advances, mortgage originations, and mortgage-backed securities purchased from Wall Street. (more…)

Cox’s Last Stand

Posted by Larry Doyle on June 2nd, 2009 3:02 PM |

Chris Cox’s tenure as chair of the SEC was not highly regarded. From the debacle with the Bernie Madoff situation, to the failure of Lehman Bros., to the fraud encompassing Auction Rate Securities, the SEC under Cox was reduced to a kangaroo court. Knowing full well that he and his regime at the SEC would largely be held in contempt, it appears that Cox attempted to salvage some degree of respect as he prepared to depart. How so? Bloomberg reports Cox Questioned Fannie, Freddie Oversight While At SEC:

Christopher Cox, in one of his last acts as Securities and Exchange Commission chairman, took Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s regulator to task in a letter questioning whether the agency was upholding its legal duty to “preserve and conserve” the mortgage companies’ assets.

Cox asked in the Jan. 16 letter to Federal Housing Finance Agency Director James Lockhart whether the government-sponsored enterprises were being pressed too hard to bolster U.S. housing markets at the expense of profits. As a member of an oversight board advising Lockhart, Cox urged Lockhart to develop an “exit strategy” from government conservatorship that would restore the companies’ finances.

Cox’s questioning of the motivation and practices of the FHFA eerily reminds us of the pressures applied to Freddie Mac CFO David Kellerman prior to his taking his life. Clearly, Cox and Kellerman were uncomfortable in the approach and practices promoted by Uncle Sam. As The New York Times reported on April 22, 2009, Reported Suicide is Latest Shock at Freddie Mac:

Mr. Kellermann was also working in a poisonous political atmosphere. In addition to taking criticism over the bonuses, he was recently involved in tense conversations with the company’s federal regulator over its routine financial disclosures, according to people close to those discussions who also spoke on condition of anonymity. Freddie Mac executives wanted to emphasize to investors that they believed the company was being run to benefit the government, rather than shareholders. The company’s regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Authority, had pushed to play down that language. Freddie Mac reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission that changes it had made in practices to help the government “have increased our expenses or caused us to forgo revenue opportunities.”

In a very similar fashion, Bloomberg today reports:

The letter from Cox, which hasn’t been made public, underscores the tension between Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s responsibilities to investors and government demands that they help end the worst housing crisis since the Great Depression. The issues facing the companies, saddled with seven consecutive quarters of losses totaling $150 billion, will be examined by a House panel tomorrow.

Certainly both Cox and Kellerman felt seriously troubled and conflicted between their roles and responsibilities and the goals of the government programs. The government programs have amounted to a massive redistribution of wealth to select American homeowners from investors, with the ultimate burden being assumed by American taxpayers.

Cox is trying to defend what is left of his reputation by shedding light on the magnitude of the “red sea” of embedded losses at Freddie and Fannie. Over and above that, the systemic risk posed by Freddie and Fannie has very real risk for other quasi-government agencies. Bloomberg addresses all of the possible consequences:

Failure to make Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac financially sound would impose expanded burdens on the Treasury and private debt markets because their $1.7 trillion in unsecured debt and $4 trillion in mortgage bonds are so widely held, he said. The government would bear responsibility even though the companies’ liabilities aren’t technically backed by its full faith and credit, he wrote.

The U.S. may be forced to assume the companies’ liabilities, increasing the $11.3 trillion in outstanding U.S. debt by about 50 percent and hampering the Treasury’s ability to borrow, Cox said.

If the government chose not to back Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s debt and they defaulted, Cox said there may be “significant impact on both the Treasury market as well as the agency market, including the Federal Home Loan Banks, the Farm Credit System and the Tennessee Valley Authority.

While Chris Cox has now been relegated to a punching bag in the pursuit of regulatory reform, he should be commended for drawing attention to the ugly underside of our financial system embodied by Freddie, Fannie, and their cousins FHLB, FCS, and TVA.

LD

FHLBs: Red Sea, Dead Sea or Both?

Posted by Larry Doyle on May 25th, 2009 8:46 AM |

On April 2nd, in a post Putting Perfume on a Pig,  I compared Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, and the Federal Home Loan Bank system to the Red Sea. Why? For the very simple reason that for the foreseeable future, these entities will accrue losses. How? Unlike commercial banks, Freddie, Fannie, and their 12 FHLBs have very little earnings power in this environment while faced with a steady stream of losses on their mortgage holdings given ongoing defaults and foreclosures.    

In retrospect, would it have been more appropriate to compare the FHLB system to the Dead Sea than the Red Sea? I think it may. As the Wall Street Journal highlights, Directors Are Faulted at Home Loan Banks:    

Financial troubles at some of the Federal Home Loan Banks are raising questions about how well directors of these institutions are supervising their executives.

A plunge in the value of mortgage securities bought by several of the regional home-loan banks has forced them to halt dividends and curtail funding for local housing projects. An annual report issued by the banks’ regulator this past week says some of them “paid insufficient attention” to credit risks and haven’t invested enough in information technology.

Unlike giant banks or government-backed mortgage companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the 12 regional home-loan banks draw little public scrutiny. (LD’s emphasis) Created by Congress in 1932 to support the housing market, they are cooperatives owned by more than 8,000 banks, thrifts, credit unions and insurers.

Why do these home loan banks draw such little public scrutiny? They are the wholesale entity (providing funds) to their retail network (banks, thrifts, credit unions, insurers) which deals with the public. With no interaction with the public, the media and market analysts have accorded them little coverage. Thus, I make the assertion that these banks truly are a combination of both the Red Sea (ongoing losses) and Dead Sea (no coverage).  (more…)






Recent Posts


ECONOMIC ALL-STARS


Archives