Mortgage Foreclosure Abuse: The Fight Continues
Posted by Larry Doyle on January 27th, 2014 8:28 AM |
I wish I had the silver bullet to address and fix the rampant abusive practices that have transpired within the mortgage servicing entities of many of our large banks and elsewhere.
I don’t.
That said, the ongoing problematic issues within mortgage servicing practices remain prevalent. How do I know? I hear from people entangled in this mess on an ongoing basis.
In my opinion, these issues go right to the core of what I believe is the problem with the structure of our banking industry in America today. That problem centers on the fact that we have a few banks (e.g., JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo) that dominate the market, especially within the mortgage realm.
As many longtime readers of my blog are aware, this economic structure known as an oligopoly allows, if not promotes, the following abusive type practices: (more…)
Aiding and Abetting Mortgage Fraud
Posted by Larry Doyle on October 19th, 2010 4:54 AM |
While selected Wall Street banks and their cronies in Washington may want to downplay the depth and impact of the mortgage fraud embedded in our national foreclosure crisis, anyone with a modicum of ‘sense on cents’ knows that this fiasco has many players with their hands in the till. Our friends at The Center for Public Integrity recently highlighted the manner in which those in the legal profession have aided and abbeted this enormous fraud. Let’s navigate.
The role of lawyers in the foreclosure process has garnered less attention, but they play a big role, especially in those states that require banks to go to court to get a foreclosure order. (The same states where the lenders have suspended foreclosures). In these states, banks are required to produce a notarized affidavit of a loan officer and submit the mortgage documents. Those documents, though, are difficult to produce, thanks to the securitization craze.
As CNBC notes in this helpful primer to the foreclosure crisis, every time a mortgage changes hands, the new owners are supposed to receive an “assignment” of the mortgage notes from the buyers. For securitized loans, the mortgages are assigned to a specially created investment vehicle.
During the housing bubble, however, the notes and other critical documents were often either not properly transferred or simply not created. Other records vanished along with failed brokers and lenders. This means that lawyers charged with putting together the paper trail often have a tough job. Over the past few years, some have used shortcuts. (more…)
Have Mortgage Delinquencies Peaked?
Posted by Larry Doyle on December 8th, 2009 9:43 AM |
This past May, I designated mortgage delinquencies as “The Most Critical Economic Statistic.” I wrote then and continue to believe now:
Which economic statistic is the most important? Unemployment? Housing starts? Trade deficit? Inflation? Retail sales?
Well, they are all important . . . but as I review the many statistics, the economic data that I believe most significant are loan delinquencies.
While assorted analysts and economists have called the bottom in housing numerous times, rest assured a true bottom will not be established until we see a meaningful decline in mortgage delinquencies. Why? There is a strong correlation between delinquencies, defaults, and foreclosures. Until delinquencies decline, the supply of homes coming onto the market through the foreclosure process will not abate.
While analysts and economists have been wrong in their calls to this point, I keep my eyes and ears open when another entity calls a peak in the rate of delinquencies. I witnessed another one again this morning. (more…)
Elizabeth Warren Highlights Washington’s Losing Battle on Housing
Posted by Larry Doyle on October 9th, 2009 9:21 AM |
Who in Washington will give you a straight answer? Elizabeth Warren.
Who is Elizabeth Warren? Her Wikipedia bio reads:
Elizabeth Warren
Elizabeth Warren (born 1949) is the Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, where she teaches contract law, bankruptcy, and commercial law. In the wake of the 2008-9 financial crisis, she has also become the chair of the Congressional Oversight Panel created to oversee the U.S. banking bailout, formally known as the Troubled Assets Relief Program. In 2007, she first developed the idea to create a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency, which President Barack Obama, Christopher Dodd, and Barney Frank are now advocating as part of their financial regulatory reform proposals.
In May 2009, Warren was named one of Time Magazine’s 100 Most Influential People in the World.
Ms. Warren consistently takes no prisoners or provides no pandering in making honest assessments of the interaction between Washington and Wall Street. She has called the banks on the carpet. She has called Secretary Geithner on the carpet. She has called Congress on the carpet. Why? A general lack of honesty, integrity, and transparency in dealing with the American public.
When she speaks, I listen.
What did she have to say this morning? In commenting on a recently released report on the effectiveness of government programs to support housing, Warren questioned the scalability and the permanence of the impact of the TARP funding. Bloomberg provides further color in writing TARP Oversight Group Says Treasury Mortgage Plan Not Effective. The report highlights:
“Rising unemployment, generally flat or even falling home prices and impending mortgage-rate resets threaten to cast millions more out of their homes,” the report said. “The panel urges Treasury to reconsider the scope, scalability and permanence of the programs designed to minimize the economic impact of foreclosures and consider whether new programs or program enhancements could be adopted.”
New programs or program enhancements? Yesterday I opined “Washington Needs a New Housing Model” and wrote:
While the administration swims upstream on this issue, bank policy of tight credit and restrictive lending only further exacerbates the housing market. Make no mistake, though, banks are taking that approach to tight credit at the behest of regulators who know the level of losses in the banking system and are trying to preserve the industry as a whole.
I like a rallying equity market as much as anybody, but I wouldn’t spend any paper gains just yet. Why? The new housing model is displaying that:
“As defaults become more common, the social stigma attached with defaulting will likely be reduced, especially if there continues to be few repercussions for people who walk away from their loans,” concluded Sapienza. “This has an adverse effect on homeowners who do pay their mortgages, and the after-effects of more defaults and more price collapse could be economic catastrophe.”
This model needs some quick-dry crazy glue, which could only be applied in the form of a serious principal reduction program. Banks would take immediate and massive hits to capital which they clearly won’t accept.
So how can we generate some support for housing?
Aside from a principal reduction program, the penalty for those who would strategically default on their mortgage needs to be far more onerous.
The principal reduction would negatively impact bank earnings. Too bad. The banks are currently feeding at the taxpayer trough and would not be here without the bailouts. The individuals who are capable of making their payments need to accept the moral responsibility that is embedded in a contract.
Given the massive violation of moral hazards and breaking of contracts by Uncle Sam, that old man does not have a lot of credibility on that front.
What do we really learn here? Ultimately, the market is the market and efforts to manipulate or support a falling market will only be temporary. The market needs to find the clearing level where private money will purchase properties. That private money will wait while Uncle Sam continues to try to prop the market.
In the meantime, do not expect any meaningful support for housing.
LD
A Picture Is Worth A Thousand Words
Posted by Larry Doyle on May 29th, 2009 10:47 AM |
This video clip with graphs provided by the Financial Times addresses the surging rate of delinquencies, foreclosures, mortgage rates, and Treasury rates.
The historical view provided by these graphs gives us reason to pause and question the potential for a near term real economic recovery.
LD