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HomeFINRA 2008 Annual Report: A Special Type of Hubris
Posted by Larry Doyle on June 29th, 2009 3:14 PM |
At first blush, I viewed the text of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s (FINRA’s) 2008 Annual Report as nothing more than standard corporate fare. With the benefit of a few days to ponder FINRA’s delivery, I am actually amazed, although never surprised, by the gall of this regulatory organization. In fact, I can only describe FINRA as displaying a special type of hubris in addressing the fraud encompassing Auction-Rate Securities.
I personally believe it is very important for a financial self-regulatory organization, such as FINRA, to be totally transparent in every regard. Why? Very simply, transparency promotes confidence and FINRA’s position as a financial regulator should begin and end with that goal.
Against that backdrop, FINRA should not directly manage any of their own funds. To do so is an open invitation for conflicts of interest. FINRA’s own investment portfolio, managed by an Investment Committee, generated a negative 26% return in 2008. In April 2009, the FINRA portfolio shifted to a lower volatility approach but in 2008 it continued to have exposure to hedge funds, fund of funds, and private equity. As much as I believe this is a very big deal, it pales in comparison to the major issue I, and others, have with FINRA: their involvement with Auction-Rate Securities. Let’s dive into this part of the report and comment as appropriate.
FINRA sets the table:
Throughout the financial crisis, FINRA has worked closely with other regulators, particularly the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Reserve, to examine firm activities for compliance with FINRA rules and federal securities laws, investigate wrongdoing and, when rules were broken, enforcing those rules.
As well they should. However, Finra obviously did not work too closely with the SEC to detect the fraud ongoing with Bernie Madoff. In fact, Finra’s only reference to the Madoff situation is one sentence highlighting the fact that the current financial regulatory structure does not overlap the efforts overseeing broker-dealers with those of investment advisors.
FINRA continues to make their case in stating:
The instability in the markets, and at a number of financial institutions, heightened investor fears. FINRA helped to allay those fears, and foster confidence, by working to ensure the protection of customer assets at troubled institutions.
How can they make this statement with a straight face knowing that thousands of investors and tens of billions of dollars remain frozen in Auction-Rate Securities? A number of Wall Street institutions continue to collect fees from these securities. Hubris? You think?
FINRA continues:
Vigorous enforcement of rules and regulations is a cornerstone of FINRA’s work to protect investors. In 2008, FINRA focused its efforts in several areas of investor harm—including excessive commissions, unsuitable mutual fund share class recommendations and sales, penny stock sales and auction rate securities recommendations and sales.
The hubris grows.
Let’s move forward. FINRA boldly and specifically addresses the Auction-Rate Securities market. I would have thought FINRA may have ducked this topic given the fact that they had sold $647 million ARS in 2007. The fact that they have willingly ‘opened this can of worms’ leaves them subject to fair and open questions. FINRA puts forth: (more…)
The Wall Street “Sausage-Making” Process
Posted by Larry Doyle on June 20th, 2009 9:01 AM |
Why do pigs need to go through such a curing process before finding their way to market? The innards of a pig are filled with all sorts of waste. In the same vein, the new Wall Street pig, otherwise known as an x-Tender security (but hereby deemed Porky Pig at Sense on Cents), is also filled with similar “junk.” I will try to make this quick, but bring a mask as we navigate the Wall Street sausage factory.
Please recall from my post yesterday, “An Auction-Rate Pig by Any Other Name Is Still a Pig”, that this ‘new’ Wall Street product is merely a revised version of THE LARGEST fraud perpetrated in the history of finance. This “pig” allows municipalities to address long-term funding needs via the short term debt market. The arbitrage involved in that process is akin to slaughtering the pig and making sausage.
Given the stench surrounding this product, take a deep breath as we tip-toe through the pigsty and move into the sausage factory. The Wall Street Journal can serve as our tour guide as it writes, Belt-Tightening by States Squeezes Cities and Towns. Let me connect the dots.
As this article highlights, municipalities across our country are increasingly financially strapped by a combination of decreasing tax revenues and lessened state funding. Regrettably, these municipalities are forced to cut expenses via a reduction in services and layoffs. Additionally, it is only logical to expect that municipalities will increase taxes to bridge their financial gap.
Add it all up, though, and it is very clear that an overwhelming number of municipalities in our nation are not as creditworthy today as a year or two ago. When credit ratings decline, borrowing costs go up. Those increased borrowing costs further squeeze the municipalities. What to do? Let’s enter the sausage factory.
With the blessing of the SEC, and the wizardry of financial engineers on Wall Street, municipalities can address long-term funding needs by borrowing money via the short-term market with a ‘promise’ to repay the funds if the short-term market shuts down. These municipal deals, much like sausage, are packaged and distributed via money market funds that incorporate a variety of short term deals. As such, the poorer credit quality of the municipality is “processed” and sold without investors fully appreciating the contents of the money market fund.
This works, right? The municipality receives the badly needed funds and the Wall Street banks earn their fees. Meanwhile, investors – who by nature move in and out of money market funds expecting them never to “break the buck” (meaning the funds will always maintain a $1.00 net asset value) – are kept in the dark.
Investors should appreciate that money market funds will likely “break the buck” going forward. All one needs to do is review the fiasco involved with the longstanding money market fund, The Reserve Fund. Investors in that money market fund are now involved in a protracted legal dispute and the value of the fund is truly a great unknown. What happened? The fund took increased credit risk in a variety of products. Investors were clueless of these credit risks.
The same “sausage-making” is going on with this new x-Tender product. I exhort every investor to “check the contents” and ask the “butcher”, that being your broker or financial planner, as to what is going into that money market fund before you buy it.
LD
Who Protects Investors from Regulators?
Posted by Larry Doyle on June 19th, 2009 2:44 PM |
Is there anything worse than being violated by an individual in a position of trust? Crimes perpetrated by regular citizens are one thing, but crimes perpetrated by individuals in a position of public trust, in my opinion, are the most heinous. I am speaking of members of the clergy, teachers, law enforcement, and public servants.
When engaged in private business, individuals typically remain on guard from fraudulent and criminal behavior. That innate defense mechanism is usually relaxed when engaged with a public or quasi-public official. Given that vulnerability, the violation is far more painful due to the emotional damage even if the actual financial costs are minimal.
As I go down this path, let me emphasize the obvious – that is, the presumption of innocence and due process.
1. Today we learn that as part of the case against Allen Stanford, an indictment has also been handed down against Antiguan financial regulator Leroy King. Bloomberg reports that King not only took bribes from Stanford but also showed Stanford information relating to the government’s developing case.
If in fact these allegations are true, King aided and abetted the fraud which is speculated to be of a magnitude of $1-7 billion dollars.
2. In regard to the Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme, we have no evidence to indicate criminal intent or activity on behalf of anybody at the SEC. That said, the SEC – by its own admission – failed to perform its duties. For those impacted by the Madoff fraud, the lack of accountability by the SEC is no less damaging than if there were criminal activity. Why is that? The length of time over which Madoff perpetrated the scheme along with the amount of evidence provided by Harry Markopolos was so overwhelming and should have minimized the damage, both financial and emotional.
3. We do have evidence of potential culpability on behalf of FINRA in the Auction-Rate Securities fraud. FINRA was headed by Mary Schapiro, current head of the SEC. This fraud is MANY MULTIPLES the size of the fraud perpetrated by Allen Stanford. Professionals, both inside and outside of the financial industry, have estimated that there are anywhere from $80 billion to $175 billion ARS (of a $330 billion market) still outstanding.
Let’s take the midpoint of those estimates, $125 billion, as a best guess of outstanding ARS positions. These securities do not actively trade, like government bonds, but in speaking with Kevin O’Connor of Second Market, he shared that bonds trade around 75 cents on the dollar. Thus, we are looking at approximately $30 billion in losses on a mark-to-market basis.
FINRA’s potential culpability stems from the fact that they liquidated their own ARS holdings in 2007. I have asked repeatedly and will put forth once again, for the benefit of those thousands of investors and billions of dollars:
-what was the exact trade date of FINRA’s ARS liquidation?
-through whom did they liquidate their ARS position?
-what price were they paid for their ARS position?
-did they possess material non-public information about the ARS market failing and act upon it?
The U.S. attorney and SEC are investigating executives from Lehman (Gia Rys, Alex Kirk) for potentially front running the ARS market in 2007. Will we ever find out if FINRA did the same? FINRA is charged with protecting investors. They certainly failed to protect investors in Auction-Rate Securities.
4. Given the fraud involved in the marketing and distribution of ARS, I am blown away by the fact that the SEC, now headed by Ms. Schapiro, blessed the marketing and distribution of the new version of municipal ARS, known as x-Tender, or henceforth called Porky Pig here at Sense on ¢ents. Please see my post earlier today, An Auction-Rate Pig by Any Other Name Is Still a Pig.
Sad but true, as we enter the Brave New World of the Uncle Sam economy, investors need to remain diligent and should not assume that regulators are necessarily protecting them.
LD
“Lehman Sued Over Conflict in Auction-Rate Securities”
Posted by Larry Doyle on June 10th, 2009 8:02 AM |
Why does a $190 million lawsuit receive scant coverage? Why does a $100 billion plus financial fraud pass below the radar screen? With the exception of Bloomberg News, the scandal surrounding Auction Rate Securities receives very limited serious coverage.
Well, with figures the magnitude of those mentioned above, Sense on Cents is highly energized to publicize the scandal and the embedded conflicts in this fraud.
Bloomberg reports, Lehman Sued Over Conflict in Auction-Rate Securities:
June 9 (Bloomberg) — Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. was sued by two companies seeking more than $190 million over claims the bankrupt investment bank misrepresented the risk of auction- rate securities and had a conflict of interest in their sale.
The complaints against Lehman Brothers, which filed the biggest bankruptcy in U.S. history last September, were filed in federal bankruptcy court in Manhattan. Ceradyne Inc. and Western Digital Corp. claim Lehman had a conflict of interest serving as underwriter and seller of the securities.
Lehman Brothers wrongly asserted that interest rates on the securities were set through a well-established market, and that they were tradable, liquid, short-term investments, according to the complaint.
“The reality, well known to Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. but undisclosed to Western Digital Corp., was that, in fact, auction rate securities was not supported by a broad, fully- functioning market and therefore could be subject to failed auctions and illiquidity,” according to the complaint.
The $330 billion auction-rate market collapsed in February, 2008, sparking a series of regulatory probes into how brokerages marketed the long-term securities. One year later investors were stuck with as much as $176 billion of the securities even after regulators have forced banks to buy back more than $50 billion of auction-rate debt that was marketed as safe, cash-like instruments.
Justice Department Probe
Last month, the Wall Street Journal, citing unnamed sources, reported that former Lehman executives have been questioned by U.S. Justice Department officials in an investigation of the company’s auction-rate securities sales.
Ceradyne is a Costa Mesa, California-based maker of ceramic body armor for U.S. soldiers, and Western Digital Corp., based in Lake Forest, California, manufactures hard-disk drives.
Lehman spokeswoman Kimberly Macleod didn’t immediately return a call seeking comment after business hours.
The case is In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., 08-13555, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan).
The key phrase in this story from my perspective is “conflict of interest.” The claimants are asserting that Lehman should have known and revealed the embedded risks in ARS and that they did not because they were benefitting both as issuer and underwriter.
Having written extensively about the ARS scandal here at Sense on Cents (newer readers can access all posts by writing Auction Rate Securities in the search window in the upper right hand corner of the home page), I would STRONGLY encourage Ceradyne Inc. and Western Digital Corp. to engage Finra in their suit. How so and why?
Would Finra need to be subpoenaed or merely interviewed? I am no lawyer so I will defer on that point. That said, if Lehman were conflicted, I believe every ARS investor would benefit from knowing if Finra also had a conflict of interest in the ARS market.
Recall that Finra’s mission is to protect investors. Finra was an ARS investor itself, and liquidated $647 million in Auction Rate Securities in Spring 2007. Finra did not publicly apprise investors of the ARS meltdown until the market had totally frozen in February 2008. Shortly thereafter, Finra posted a warning on its website. Thanks for very little!!
From my ARS archives, please check out: U.S. Attorney and SEC Investigating Lehman’s Auction Rate Securities Sale; They Should Also Investigate Finra’s.
$190 million lawsuit. $176 billion of ARS. That is “real” money and it spells one enormous conflict!!
LD
How Courageous Is Mary Schapiro?
Posted by Larry Doyle on June 4th, 2009 11:57 AM |
Does SEC chair Mary Schapiro have the personal courage to lead a new and emboldened financial regulatory regime?
Ms. Schapiro has always been viewed as being far too cozy with the financial industry. Sense on Cents first crossed paths with current SEC chair Mary Schapiro this past January at the time of her exceptionally easy confirmation hearing. At that point and since, the Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg and others have weighed in that Ms. Schapiro is “no regulatory heavyweight.”
Let’s check back and see if Ms. Schapiro is breaking off the Wall Street shackles. The Washington Post does us the favor of reporting this morning, SEC Chief Strives to Rebuild Regulator:
Schapiro is working to step up enforcement efforts, pushing cases linked to the financial crisis and freeing investigators to more vigorously pursue financial wrongdoing. She is also pursuing regulations to govern hedge funds, derivatives, short-selling, money managers, corporate disclosures and governance.
I am heartened by Ms. Schapiro’s aggressive posture. That said, I am not about to accept purely on face value that Ms. Schapiro is “changing her game.”
On the heels of the financial fiasco on Wall Street, there is doubtless lots to clean up. However, Ms. Schapiro has to appreciate that many question her courage in taking on this task. Why? Very simply, her track record as head of Finra saw an unprecedented drop in sanctions and fines. As the WSJ highlighted this past January:
Fines collected and sanctions assessed by Finra under Ms. Schapiro’s leadership dropped by 73% (in 2005, prior to Ms. Schapiro assuming leadership, Finra collected $150 million in fines. In 2006, Schapiro assumed the leadership reins and that number moved to $75mm. It dropped further to $50mm in 2007, and $35-40mm in 2008).
Against that backdrop, Ms. Schapiro has a lot of work to do to change her own image along with that of the SEC. The WaPo reports that Schapiro is aware of this fact. Schapiro states as much:
“I wanted to be very clear almost from my first day — not just with words, which are pretty easy to string together, but with actions — that this is a new SEC that is moving in a decidedly different direction and at a decidedly different pace,”
Additionally, Schapiro comments,
“Our markets are vulnerable if we’re not able to restore confidence,” Schapiro said. What investors “need to see is that the rules that are in place and will be in the future are enforced and aggressively enforced. If they don’t see that, their reluctance to engage the capital markets will be pretty significant.”
The media continues to rail on Schapiro, the SEC, and Finra for having missed the Madoff scam. Those protests are totally justified. It has been almost 7 months since Bernie turned himself in to authorities and little progress is provided to the public on the investigation.
In my opinion, though, Ms. Schapiro has other dirty laundry that needs a full and public airing.
The U.S. attorney in Brooklyn along with the SEC are currently investigating former executives from Lehman for potentially front running the Auction Rate Securities market in 2007. I call upon Ms. Schapiro to release information regarding Finra’s liquidation of its own Auction Rate Securities holdings in the same time period. Full details on this story are included in U.S. Attorney and SEC Investigate Lehman’s Auction Rate Securities Sales; They Should Also Investigate FINRA’s.
Ms. Schapiro may have to recuse herself in the process of a full and thorough investigation of Finra and its ARS sale. As with any real leader, if she has absolutely nothing to hide, then she should have no problem recusing herself. As she herself said, “our markets are vulnerable if we’re not able to restore confidence.”
Does Ms. Schapiro have the courage to investigate Finra and her own tenure in an attempt to restore that confidence?
LD
Municipal Finance: Will Uncle Sam Post Bail?
Posted by Larry Doyle on May 26th, 2009 3:09 PM |
Is every village, town, city, and state in our country poised to receive a “get out of jail” free card from Uncle Sam? I linked to The New York Times article, Localities Want U.S. to Support Muni Bonds, in the Newsworthy section of Sense on Cents. Upon further review, it deserves comment.
In my opinion, this support of the municipal market may very well represent the greatest violation of a moral hazard to date. Why? Municipalities are by edict required to balance their budgets. A municipal budget which is able to obviate the tough decisions and choices in the budgetary process will lose that rigor.
Politicians of all stripes will make the case that the municipal default rate is extremely low and, as such, a federal backstop in the form of bond insurance is truly a very low risk proposition. Please allow me to opine that the same argument was made in the quasi-guarantee provided to Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Those two giants are now wards of the state having been utilized by politicians from both sides of the aisle as campaign “piggy banks” for the better part of twenty years.
The New York Times highlights that the federal guarantee of municipal debt is not all that Uncle Sam may be asked to bail:
“All kinds of municipal borrowers are facing revenue shortfalls,” said Mr. Decker. “California is the largest example. Some states are better off than others. But all outstanding debt is backed by tax revenues. And municipalities are facing a greater or lesser level of distress.”
Also clamoring for help is a group of municipalities that purchased Lehman debt, which is now nearly worthless. Legislation authorizing the use of relief money to make these purchases was introduced by two California Democratic representatives, Jackie Speier and Anna Eshoo. If approved, this would be more like a bailout than a guarantee, because the federal government would be paying face value for debt that otherwise has little value.
The price tag on that proposal is around $1.6 billion. The argument promoted by the two congresswomen is that the Treasury and Fed allowed Lehman to fail, causing governmental bodies to lose money.
Whether a price tag is $1.6 billion, $1.6 million or $1.6 trillion a potential federal bailout of a poor investment decision is the antithesis of free market capitalism. Where does it end? (more…)
ARS Investor Makes Public Plea
Posted by Larry Doyle on May 3rd, 2009 2:02 PM |
On the heels of Bloomberg breaking the news of FINRA’s investment in Auction Rate Securities, I have received a number of e-mails from ARS investors thanking me for my pursuit in publicizing that information. One e-mail in particular touched me. This investor purchased ARS from Oppenheimer. His e-mail to attorneys general around the country and major media outlets is powerful. I share his questions; they deserve answers. With the writer’s permission: (more…)
“FINRA Is Supposed To Police The Market”
Posted by Larry Doyle on April 29th, 2009 6:52 AM |
I have written extensively about FINRA’s ownership of Auction Rate Securities over the last few months. This morning Bloomberg reports, FINRA Oversees Auction-Rate Arbitrations After Exiting Market.
The Bloomberg article (I am humbled by Bloomberg quoting me in the story) answers a number of questions I have raised, while also opening the door to other issues needing to be addressed:
1. Was FINRA blinded – if not totally conflicted – in addressing the trading, selling, and marketing of Auction Rate Securities? Try 862 million times.
2. Was FINRA lucky, prescient, or well informed in the timing of the sale of their own Auction Rate Securities? We may never know but given that their first “guidance for investors” was not published until after the market had totally frozen, they certainly did not provide much investor protection as is their mandate.
3. I have also written, and Bloomberg highlights, that FINRA had money invested in hedge funds. In light of market developments, I think the public has a right to know which hedge funds. Will FINRA release that information?
4. I unearthed all the information of FINRA’s investment activities from its 2007 Annual Report published in April 2008. I am still waiting for FINRA to release its 2008 Annual Report and wonder why it seems to be delayed.
5. As we move forward with likely regulatory changes for Wall Street, I believe the very nature of a self-regulatory organization funded by the banks it is charged to oversee presents massive conflicts of interest. This specific situation of FINRA’s investment in ARS is indicative of those conflicts. Will Congress have the courage to address these conflicts and serve the public interest in the process?
“To me it smacks of incompetence and negligence,” said Larry Doyle, who worked 23 years on Wall Street and runs a Web site called Sense on Cents. “Finra is supposed to police the market.”
I view FINRA as akin to the palace guard. The question remains, Does The Palace Guard Have No Clothes?
LD
