ARS Update April 2013: The Nightmare Continues
Posted by Larry Doyle on April 25th, 2013 8:43 AM |
Five plus years after the meltdown of the largest fraud ever perpetrated on Wall Street, and the nightmare that defines the world of auction-rate securities goes on.
While Wall Street, Washington, and the media would very much like to leave the pain encompassing the ARS market largely in the rear view mirror, for many individuals who still hold on to the hope that they may ultimately get repaid in full from these widely distributed “cash-surrogate” instruments, the pain and anxiety remain front and center.
I continue to hear regularly from many individual ARS holders.
Not that anybody needs further reason to know that individual investors on Wall Street are at an enormous disadvantage in the face of captured and corrupted regulators and institutions that possess more information, but a recent piece of data I unearthed while working on my upcoming book (think I might be able to get Mary Schapiro to come to a book signing and autograph some copies!!??) speaks volumes to this point. (more…)
An Open Letter to the Board of FINRA Regarding Auction-Rate Securities
Posted by Larry Doyle on July 27th, 2009 3:17 PM |
To: The Board of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA);
FINRA Investment Committee;
FINRA Audit Committee
From: Larry Doyle, Sense on Cents
Re: Auction-Rate Securities
I am a longstanding Wall Street veteran, a private investor, an avid supporter of free and fair markets, and a financial blogger at my site, Sense on Cents.
I launched my website/blog earlier this year specifically to help people more fully understand the economy and the markets during these challenging times.
In my opinion, the greatest challenge facing our markets and our country at this time is the question of confidence and integrity in the system. Little surprise why the topic of financial regulatory reform is receiving so much attention.
Against that backdrop, I am heartened by recent increased legal action taken primarily by selected attorneys general in pursuing entities involved in the fraudulent marketing and distribution of Auction-Rate Securities. We could debate at length why and how the ARS market failed, but there is no doubt these securities, sold as cash surrogates, were distributed in a fraudulent fashion. Thousands of investors and approximately $165 billion in ARS remain frozen.
I view the ARS market as having three legs — issuers, investors, and distributors (both primary Wall Street banks/brokers and downstream entities). Who was situated at the epicenter of this debacle charged with protecting investors? The SEC and FINRA.
FINRA specifically occupied a position not only as a regulator but also as an ARS investor. Whether FINRA representatives want to believe it or not, any semblance of rational and prudent thought would determine that FINRA was conflicted as a result.
Having written extensively on this topic and engaged FINRA spokesperson Herb Perone on this issue, I call upon you, the members of FINRA’s Board, Investment Committee, and Audit Committee, to release all pertinent details involved with FINRA’s liquidation of their ARS position in 2007.
Why is this necessary? Very simply, in order to regain total confidence in the markets it is of paramount importance that there be complete transparency and integrity on behalf of the regulators. To that end, for the benefit of all issuers, investors, and distributors of ARS, I believe it is incumbent on you to release the following information regarding FINRA’s liquidation of ARS:
1. Date of sale
2. To whom or through whom did the liquidation occur?
3. At what price did FINRA sell their ARS?
4. Why did FINRA decide to liquidate the entire $647 million ARS at that time?
5. Did FINRA possess material non-public information at the time of liquidation and act upon it?
6. Given that FINRA is charged with protecting investors, and given its position in the financial industry, how and why did they not post an investor warning about the freezing and subsequent failure of the ARS market prior to its complete failure in early 2008? How many investors and how many dollars could have been protected in the process?
I issue this letter publicly hoping that others may also be able to utilize the information contained herein and generate the release of this information.
In the spirit of full disclosure, I have never owned an Auction-Rate Security. I write merely as a private individual interested in helping the thousands of investors looking for a timely return of their capital.
I thank you.
Respectfully,
Larry Doyle
http://www.senseoncents.com/about/
Where Is Finra’s 2008 Annual Report?
Posted by Larry Doyle on June 8th, 2009 10:33 AM |
Finra released its 2007 Annual Report in mid-April 2008. Here it is June 8, 2009 and Finra has yet to release its 2008 Annual Report. What is going on? Aside from speculating, I called Finra this morning to inquire.
A source from within Finra’s Media Source division informed me to call back in a month. I questioned how and why in a period of economic and market dislocation, and with a heightened sensitivity on increased regulatory transparency, that Finra is being less transparent. I received a healthy dose of red tape and little direction. I have a call into Finra spokesman Herb Perone. That said, June 8, 2009 and no Annual Report. “Call back in a month.”
Why do I want to review Finra’s 2008 Annual Report? I know that fines and sanctions collected by Finra diminished by approximately 30% over the last year. The WSJ highlighted that information and I expounded upon it in writing, How Courageous is Mary Schapiro? My specific area of interest is a review of Finra’s investments within their own internal portfolio.
Recall that from their investment portfolio, Finra sold $647 million (position as of year end 2006) of Auction Rate Securities in Spring 2007. What did Finra do with their investments in hedge funds, fund of funds, private equity, common equities, and fixed income? Would Finra be so forthcoming as to provide insight as to why they needed to raise all that cash from the Auction Rate Securities liquidation?
Our markets and economy are screaming for increased transparency and regulation in an attempt to reinstill a measure of investor confidence.
Finra is prominently situated as a Wall Street regulatory body. Finra is currently being less transparent than a year ago. Why? Ms. Schapiro at the SEC and Richard Ketchum, new head of Finra, can TALK all they want about increased transparency and stiffer regulations. Talk is cheap. Information is everything.
“Call back in a month…” does NOT get it done.
LD
NASD Knew Auction Rate Securities Weren’t Cash
Posted by Larry Doyle on May 11th, 2009 10:45 AM |
Everybody knows Auction Rate Securities (ARS) were cash or cash-like, correct? FINRA certainly did NOTHING to protect investors from the ARS sales and marketing scam perpetrated on investors.
FINRA spokesman Herb Perone would like to wash his hands and those of FINRA of any negligence or incompetence in regard to FINRA’s investments in Auction Rate Securities. The easiest manner of washing one’s hands is to point the finger at the entity which initially made the investment, in this case the NASD (National Association of Securities Dealers). If you recall, FINRA was formed in mid-2007 from the regulatory arms of the NYSE and NASD. In any event, Perone tries to deflect culpability on FINRA’s part in the recently reported Bloomberg story (FINRA Oversees Auction-Rate Arbitrations After Exit) highlighting FINRA’s sale of their Auction Rate Securities prior to the market’s implosion leaving thousands of investors and billions of dollars frozen. Bloomberg reports:
“The market was functioning normally when NASD was investing in these securities,” Perone said. At the time, auction-rate securities “were viewed as high-quality cash equivalents and as acceptable investment for institutions,” he said.
Perone further offers:
“It was for cash that we needed to have parked for a temporary period of time,” Perone said. “It was common to take cash you needed to hold and put it in auction-rate securities.”
If ARS were viewed as high-quality cash equivalents, why didn’t the NASD actually account for them in that manner? The NASD goes out of its way in its Annual Reports for 2003-2005 to highlight the fact that ARS were not cash or cash-like.
From page 38 of the NASD’s 2005 Annual Report, published on May 10, 2006:
Available-for-sale investments also include investments in auction rate securities, which are either preferred stock or bonds with interest rates that reset periodically, typically less than every 90 days, based on a Dutch auction process. Given the longer-term maturities of these securities, they are classified as available-for-sale investments, rather than cash and cash equivalents.
From page 30 of the NASD’s 2004 Annual Report, published on April 29, 2005:
Available-for-sale investments also include investments in auction rate securities, which are either preferred stock or bonds with interest rates that reset periodically, typically less than every 90 days, based on a Dutch auction process. Given the longer-term maturities of these securities, they are classified as available-for-sale investments, rather than cash and cash equivalents.
From page 27 of the NASD’s 2003 Annual Report published on June 7, 2004:
Available-for-sale investments also include investments in auction rate securities, which are either preferred stock or bonds with interest rates that reset periodically, typically less than every 90 days, based on a Dutch auction process. Given the longer-term maturities of these securities, they are classified as available-for-sale investments.
I have been questioning whether FINRA was negligent, incompetent or both in regard to their investment in ARS. FINRA could not have been negligent. Their parent organization, the NASD, lays it out in three separate Annual Reports that ARS were not cash or cash equivalents.
Thus, FINRA was merely incompetent in not protecting investors, as is its mandate!!
How may this be adjudicated? It is now speculated that Uncle Sam may establish a liquidity facility which investors can tap to get their money. This liquidity facility may be part of a larger government entity. I do hope this facility is enacted and that ARS investors can receive a timely return of their funds.
However, to whom does the obligation and cost shift? The American taxpayer. Once again, the taxpayer may pick up the tab for an activity (the sales and marketing of ARS by banks and investment managers) deemed a fraud by federal judges.
LD
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