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HomeReport Indicates 1 in 5 Hedge Funds Have Lied or Misrepresented
Posted by Larry Doyle on October 16th, 2009 3:16 PM |
Trust but verify.
How does one verify representations for an industry that has traditionally been anything but transparent? Serious due diligence. Why should individuals be extremely cautious prior to investing in a hedge fund? The lack of transparency and the challenge of being able to employ real due diligence.
To that end, the hedge fund industry has largely operated on a trust basis and marketing which employs a lot of ‘word of mouth’ introductions. Against that backdrop, this corner of the investing universe is exceptionally challenging.
Without the ability to truly verify assertions made and returns generated by hedge funds, investors in hedge funds allocate capital with greater risk. In spite of these risks, the hedge fund industry has amazingly been able to operate under a fee structure in which investors annually pay 2% of assets and 20% of profits.
I know plenty of individuals who work at hedge funds. As with any undertaking, it would be irresponsible of me or anybody to impugn an entire industry. That said, I have always thought the lack of transparency and lack in the ability to truly verify investing styles and returns as being a significant reason not to invest.
From that standpoint, I was particularly interested to review a research report, Trust and Delegation, recently released by a number of graduate professors in finance:
Stephen Brown is the David S. Loeb Professor of Finance at New York University Stern School of Business; William Goetzmann is the Edwin J. Beinecke Professor of Finance and Management, Yale School of Management; Bing Liang is Professor of Finance, Isenberg School of Management, University of Massachusetts; Christopher Schwarz is Assistant Professor of Finance at the University of California at Irvine. We thank Bob Krause, Hossein Kazemi, and Andrew Lo for helpful comments. We are grateful to HedgeFundDueDiligence.com for providing their data for this research (http://www.hedgefundduediligence.com/).
What did this extensive research report highlight?
Due to imperfect transparency and costly auditing, trust is an essential component of financial intermediation. In this paper we study a comprehensive sample of due diligence reports from a major hedge fund due diligence firm. A routine feature of due diligence is an assessment of integrity. We find that misrepresentation about past legal and regulatory problems is frequent (21%), as is incorrect or unverifiable representations about other topics (28%). Misrepresentation, the failure to use a major auditing firm and the use of internal pricing are significantly related to legal and regulatory problems, indices of operational risk. Due diligence (DD) reports are costly and are only performed when a fund is seriously considered for investment. It is important to control for this conditioning which would otherwise bias cross-sectional analysis. We find that DD reports are typically issued on high return funds three months after the historical performance has peaked. DD reports are also issued at the point of highest cash flow into the fund. This pattern is consistent with return chasing behavior by institutional hedge fund investors.
Wow. Misrepresentations have occurred in 21% to 28% of the hundreds of hedge funds studied.
Honestly, I am not surprised. If hedge fund managers lie about one part of their business, do you think it is all that difficult to lie and misrepresent returns, investment valuations, and other critical parts of their business?
The inability to verify returns is always an opportunity for a hedge fund manager to fudge those returns when the numbers are not good.
This report may not be surprising, but it is enlightening. For those who would like a deeper view into this corner of our financial landscape, please click on the report below. ~LD
Bear Stearns Hedge Fund Managers ‘Facing the Music’
Posted by Larry Doyle on October 12th, 2009 12:29 PM |
Is it possible for an industry to accrue trillions in losses and nary an individual forced to truly ‘face the music?’ That reality, perhaps more than any other, is the greatest indictment of the incestuous relationship between Wall Street and its regulatory oversight in the form of the SEC and FINRA.
The music is about to start playing as Bear Stearns hedge fund managers Ralph Cioffi and Matthew Tannin enter court this week for the start of their trial in which they are accused of misrepresenting the health of their two hedge funds at Bear Stearns.
This trial will attract a tremendous amount of attention. Why? The very fact that it is truly the first legitimate legal proceeding linked to the meltdown of our financial crisis. The trial will highlight incriminating statements and e-mails written by both Cioffi and Tannin. Additionally, we should expect the prosecution to present material which highlights the fact that Cioffi and Tannin seemed to intentionally misrepresent the very nature of their investment holdings.
The Wall Street Journal provides further color on this case in writing, A Case Pitting Spin Against Fraud:
A criminal trial involving two former Bear Stearns executives could help answer a key question stemming from the financial crisis: How far can Wall Street firms go to put a positive spin on bad news?
(Ralph Cioffi, a former money manager at Bear Stearns, is escorted by officials to a waiting vehicle in Manhattan on June 19, 2008.)
The two executives, Ralph Cioffi and Matthew Tannin, will fight securities-fraud charges in a widely anticipated trial beginning on Tuesday in a Brooklyn, N.Y., federal court. The money managers unsuccessfully scrambled to keep two mortgage-heavy Bear Stearns hedge funds afloat in 2007 amid sinking mortgage-market prices, the first of several blows that eventually felled Bear Stearns and marked the start of the credit crisis. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. bought the firm in a March 2008 fire sale.
Prosecutors accused Messrs. Cioffi and Tannin of misleading investors about the health of the two funds, testing the degree to which Wall Street should disclose bad news to investors. (more…)
What Are Credit Suisse Clients Doing and Saying?
Posted by Larry Doyle on October 9th, 2009 11:30 AM |
High five to a good friend for sharing with us tremendous insights just released by Credit Suisse. While individuals can and should develop opinions on the economy and markets, the global flow of capital from investors (obviously central banks now count as investors given massive quantitative easing programs) will determine overall market levels. Let’s navigate and assess how Credit Suisse’s client base has positioned themselves and decipher what it all means.
Credit Suisse research analysts report the following:
We are close to finishing our marketing trip in the US and Continental Europe—and take a look at the main issues our clients are focused on at the moment.
1. Caveated bullishness: Hedge funds appear optimistic (focusing on Q3 earnings as the next catalyst). Long-only funds seem cautious, while retail investors are buying bonds rather than equity. We feel there is enough scepticism to leave us bullish.
LD’s comment: CS means bullish on equities.
2. Many asset allocators still prefer credit (bonds) to equity, so there is switching potential.
LD’s comment: Asset allocators are money managers, investment advisors, et al. This comment translates into the fact that money which has been allocated to the bond market could move into equities causing a move higher in equities and a move down in bonds.
3. Investors’ main dilemma: Why have margins stabilised at such high levels? Most feel the reason is cyclical (leaving limited upside in earnings), but we suspect it could be more structural.
LD’s comment: Margins refer to corporate profit margins. The fact that CS believes that profit margins are being supported by structural developments in companies and the economy is a VERY positive assessment as it indicates a change in the foundation of the global economy which would drive equities higher.
4. Economy: Very few clients are positioning themselves aggressively on a macro view. There is little confidence on final demand given the level of excess household leverage. A third of investors are bearish on US housing (too many, in our view). Clients still see inflation, not deflation, as the main risk.
LD’s comment: investors would appear to be more cautious than optimistic with concerns that there is excess liquidity from central banks which will ultimately lead to inflation.
5. Consensus catalyst for next leg down is severe dollar weakness (LD’s highlight), leading to a US bond funding crisis or government tightening fiscal policy too early. Two areas of worrying consensus: 99% of investors appear to be dollar bears and nearly everyone believes the Fed will be very slow to raise rates.
LD’s comment: if 99% of investors are dollar bears and are positioning themselves that way in one way, shape or form, then the dollar will find support. Why? When too many people are on one side of a boat, that boat tips. If the dollar does rally, then many ‘dollar carry trades’ may enter the ‘pain chamber’ and risk-based assets would likely sell off.
6. Regions: Strong consensus to be long of emerging markets (NJA is felt to have large upside potential if US retail sales recover and the dollar remains weak). Clients are more positive on Europe than they have been for the past two years. Investors have quickly capitulated on a tactically positive call on Japan. Renewed focus on domestic plays in dollar-linked countries (especially the Middle East).
LD’s comment: NJA is non-Japan Asia
7. Sectors: We believe most clients have a bar-bell type strategy. Consensus longs are tech and commodities/gold. We found far too many oil bulls for our liking. There is a huge variance of views on banks. Sectors where there is still doubt: life companies (too opaque), media, telecoms, steel and pharma. There were very few questions on defensives.
8. Style: Clients are looking for quality growth, shifting away from the credit-related plays.
Overall, I view this report as decidedly constructive on the economy and markets, albeit with plenty of reasons for caution.
Thoughts, comments, questions always appreciated.
LD
Wall Street Compensation Reform in Name Only
Posted by Larry Doyle on October 6th, 2009 9:27 AM |
Say what you want about movie producer Michael Moore, but he is no fool in tapping into the American spirit. Moore takes on Wall Street in highlighting the enormous bank bailouts emanating from this economic crisis. While there are many factors that drove our banking industry and our economy to its knees, ultimately the Wall Street compensation system allowed those taking risk to ‘swing for the fences’ while playing ‘heads we win, tails you lose.’ Washington is going to fix this, right? Having appointed a pay czar in Ken Feinberg, the Obama administration is going to address the crux of this critical issue and reform it, right? I mean, The Wall Street Journal this very morning profiles how Pay Czar Targets Salary Cuts:
The Obama administration’s pay czar is planning to clamp down on compensation at firms receiving large sums of government aid by cutting annual cash salaries for many of the top employees under his authority, according to people familiar with the matter.
Instead of awarding large cash salaries, Kenneth Feinberg is planning to shift a chunk of an employee’s annual salary into stock that cannot be accessed for several years, these people said. Such a move, the most intrusive yet into corporate compensation, would mark the government’s first effort to curb the take-home pay of everyone from auto executives to financial traders.
Folks, with all due respect to Ken Feinberg, these efforts to implement reform in Wall Street compensation practices are largely a joke. Why? While the subtitle of the WSJ’s article includes the term ‘compensation,’ Feinberg’s focus is limited to the term in the title, that being ‘salary.’ (more…)
Treasury Seeks Unprecedented Power
Posted by Larry Doyle on March 24th, 2009 8:47 AM |
I have written at length about the problems within the banking, insurance, hedge fund, and consumer finance industries over the last 6 months. While the bulk of the media focus has been on the banking industry – and primarily the large money center banks – the erosion in asset values at these other financial companies has been accelerating.
This past Sunday evening on my weekly radio show, NQR’s Sense on Cents with Larry Doyle, I spoke extensively about the massive financial shortfall within the insurance industry. In addition, relatively early on I warned that the hedge fund industry had likely been severely mismarking many investments. From a piece I wrote on November 12, 2008:
Give it time, because hedge funds do not have to report to anybody as to what their positions are and where they have them marked. There is no doubt they have positions that are grossly mismarked and have many positions that are totally illiquid. For many investors in these funds, these are truly “roach motels.” Hedge funds will sell what is most liquid when they can to meet redemption requests. We should expect a significant number of hedge fund liquidations, consolidations, and out and out disasters.
The same can be said for a number of private equity shops. Consumer finance companies with large holdings of a variety of consumer assets are fighting for their lives as delinquencies and defaults on these assets ratchet higher. (more…)
The Wall St. Model is Broken . . . and Won’t Soon be Fixed!!
Posted by Larry Doyle on November 12th, 2008 12:15 PM |
Despite billions and now trillions of dollars in capital injections and equity investments made by our government, private equity, and sovereign wealth funds, our economic turmoil is a long way from being over. I do find it interesting that despite numerous Wall Street titans having indicated to us at different points over the last year that we were in the 7th inning of this fiasco, now a recurring theme is that we should not expect any real economic recovery until 2010. Actually, maybe we were in the 7th inning but it was the 7th inning of the first game of a 4 game series.
Well, if we want to figure out where and when we are moving forward, I think it would be beneficial to know from where and when we came.
For those over 50 years of age, perhaps you remember when mortgage money dried up. Perhaps you also recall the days of putting down 20% before you even thought of buying a home. In any event, the growth of the secondary mortgage market in the mid 1980s was a result of some very sharp financial minds on Wall St. who engineered a product called a Collateralized Mortgage Obligation (CMO). (more…)
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